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James M. Lucas*THE Fourth Amendment has played a crucial role throughout the
history of the United States by protecting "'the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life"' from unauthorized governmental
intrusion.' However, a recent decision by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals tested this issue with respect to governmental tracking of mobile
phones. 2 Although wiretapping historically required a warrant, the Fifth
Circuit now allows the government to obtain the location of mobile
phone users through mobile phone tower data pursuant to the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).3 The court's opinion cre-
ated a circuit split with the Third Circuit, the only other circuit to address
the issue. 4 This Note argues that the court's holding in In re Application
of the United States of America for Historical Cell Site Data is incorrect
because it does not accurately interpret the language of the ECPA and is
impractical when applied in practice.
The case at issue arose in the Southern District of Texas when the gov-
ernment, in three different cases, requested records regarding cell tower
location and call details for the previous sixty days.5 These requests were
directed under the ECPA,6 which states:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be is-
sued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University;
B.B.A. in Accounting and History, University of Notre Dame, 2010. The author would like
to thank Molly, Jim, Diana, Adam, and L.B. Lucas, as well as the Sego family for their love
and support. The author would also like to thank Joshua Pelfrey, the Hatton W. Sumners
Foundation, and SMU Law Review.
1. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (Application II), 724
F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2013).
3. Id. at 621-22; see generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
4. Application II, 724 F.3d at 616 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
5. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data (Application 1), 747 F.
Supp. 2d 827, 827-28 (S.D.T.X. 2013).
6. Id. at 845-46; see ECPA § 201(a).
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issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.7
However, a magistrate judge denied the requests based on the Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure.8 Specifi-
cally, the judge found that the devices would track individual's phones
twenty-four hours each day, to within several hundred feet of the individ-
uals, and would occur whether or not a call was actually placed on the
mobile phone.9 These conditions, presented without probable cause, vio-
late the Fourth Amendment.' 0
The government then appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which reversed the magistrate judge's ruling, found the requests constitu-
tional, and granted the requests." In reaching this decision, the court
considered the ripeness of the issue, the statutory language of the ECPA,
and the constitutionality of the record request portion of the ECPA.12
The Fifth Circuit quickly dispensed with the ripeness and statutory lan-
guage issues. Specifically, the court found that the issue was ripe because
"the §2703 (d) order provision was categorically unconstitutional with re-
spect to an entire class of records"' 3 and "we are presented with the unu-
sual circumstance of 'an abstract question of [Fourth Amendment] law
with no connection to a genuine factual record."1 4 The court found that
the case met the Fifth Circuit criteria for ripeness, in that it "'raise[d]
pure questions of law"' and "'[the plaintiff] would suffer hardship if re-
view were delayed."" 5 The court held that under the language of the
EPCA, a court must grant a court order if the provisions in the Act are
met, without any judicial discretion.16
The court then held that the court order portion of the ECPA was con-
stitutional because the individual mobile phone user has no reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 7 This lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy
stems from the mobile phone user's general knowledge and his contrac-
tual agreement that data from mobile phones must bounce off towers and
be stored by the mobile phone company for its own uses.' 8 Because the
information is willingly given to the company for use in its business, the
7. ECPA 201(a).
8. Application I, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 827-28.
9. Id. at 845-46.
10. Id.
11. Application II, 724 F.3d at 615.
12. Id. at 603.
13. Id. at 604.
14. Id. at 603.
15. Id. at 604 (citing Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279,
287-88 (5th Cir. 2012)).
16. Id. at 607.
17. Id. at 612-13.
18. Id. at 613-14.
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court reasoned that the phone user lacks the typical expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment.19 It should be noted that this opinion
is limited to historical data points from mobile phone towers, and does
not address requests to obtain actual conversations from a phone.20
The court's holding appears legally sound, considering Supreme Court
precedent. The court largely follows Smith v. Maryland, in which search
records of a pen register were held constitutional.21 The Supreme Court
found that the registers, installed on property owned by the phone com-
pany, 22 simply recorded calls to the phone company in its ordinary course
of business.23 Therefore, callers had no reasonable expectation of privacy
because they freely conveyed information to the third-party phone com-
pany that might eventually be given to police.24 This case, when com-
pared with the Supreme Court's holding in Smith, is factually similar and
legally correct. 25 Thus, it can be said the "analysis and ultimate determi-
nation in the case are controlled and informed by the central importance
of stare decisis."26
With due regard to precedent, the legal and privacy implications of this
case are arguably more consistent with United States v. Jones.27 Jones,
decided in 2012,28 is more recent than Smith.29 Additionally, while Jones
is not as directly on point, it deals with an equally important matter-the
ability to be tracked by a device from different locations.30 Jones ana-
lyzed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device placed on a car by a
government agent;31 in the present case the issue is the ability to be
tracked by a series of triangulation beacons through cellular phone tow-
ers.3 2 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that the use of a GPS is consid-
ered a search because it tracks the location of the user. 33 This is similar in
theory to the present case, which involves Fourth Amendment privacy
concerns through mobile phone technology. Although no one can argue
with the outcome of this case based on legal precedent, the court made
four critical mistakes when analyzing the law in light of current technol-
ogy. First, it failed to correctly analyze an individual's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy by overestimating the average mobile phone user's
knowledge of and consent to the collection of his data. Second, the court
claimed it was exercising judicial deference when, in reality, it should
19. Id.
20. Id. at 615.
21. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 744.
24. Id. at 744-45.
25. Application II, 724 F.3d at 610-13.
26. Hilton v. S. Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 201 (1991).
27. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.






have yielded to the principle of constitutional avoidance. Third, the scope
of the court's holding is unclear and does not explicitly exclude collection
of data from non-voice data streams. Finally, and most importantly, the
court did not consider the policy implications of its decision in light of
present-day technology, which is vastly different from the technology
originally contemplated by the statute.
The court's analysis of an individual's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy was most noticeably flawed.34 ThiS is readily apparent when examin-
ing the "consent" given and "knowledge" possessed by a mobile phone
user in giving up a reasonable expectation of privacy, as expressed in the
court's holding.35 Inaccurately, the court assumes that every mobile
phone user fully understands and consents to a mobile phone company's
use of his data. However, a U.S. Department of Education study, re-
leased in April of 2012, found that between forty and forty-four million
Americans performed in the lowest literacy level, and as many as fifty-
four million performed in the second lowest literacy level. 3 6 This group
comprised almost 29% of Americans in 2012.37 Conversely, between
thirty and forty million Americans performed in the highest two reading
levels, being capable of tasks "involv[ing] long and complex documents
and text passages."38 Yet, as of 2011, there were about 315 million wire-
less subscribers in the United States. 39 Did the court believe that people
with a mobile phone fully understood and consented to sharing their in-
formation with their wireless service provider?
According to the court, "[S]ervice providers' and subscribers' contrac-
tual terms . . . and providers' privacy policies expressly state that a pro-
vider uses a subscriber's location information to route his cell phone calls
... [T]hese documents inform subscribers that the providers not only use
the information, but collect it."40 Although this may be true, it does not
mean that each consumer thoroughly read and understood the contract
and its terms. In fact, 22.8% of people in the United States did not com-
plete high school on time or at all, 41 and only 30% have a bachelor's
degree.42 Moreover, even if people understand and consent to providing
their location data,43 constitutional rights have previously been protected
34. Application II, 724 F.3d 600, 610-14 (5th Cir. 2013).
35. Id.
36. Irwin S. Kirsch, et al., Adult Literacy in America: A First Look at the Findings of
the National Adult Literacy Survey, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS at xvi-xvii (3d ed.
2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93275.pdf.
37. See id. at xx.
38. Id. at xvii.
39. Wireless History Timeline, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-live/now-wire
less-works/wireless-historytimeline (last updated Nov. 2013).
40. Application II, 724 F.3d at 613.
41. Cameron Brenchley, High School Graduation Rate at Highest Level in Three De-
cades, OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2013/
01/high-school-graduation-rate-at-highest-level-in-three-decades/.
42. Daniel de Vise, Number of U.S. Adults with College Degrees Hits Historic High,
WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-02-23/national/
35442376_1_college-degrees-college-educated-population-liberal-arts.
43. Application II, 724 F.3d at 612.
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against unknowing waiver.44 The court should protect individual rights of
those with little ability to understand difficult contract language, rather
than assume that they can understand and sign away such rights. This
concept does not erode personal responsibility or contractarian principles
because this is not a contract issue 45 but, rather, is a protection of one of
the most important constitutional rights. 46
Furthermore, the court is incorrect in its assertion that consumers give
express consent to data collection because they do not have to use mobile
phones and may choose between different providers if a mobile phone is
truly required.47 Although this may be true in theory, it is devoid of any
modicum of reality. This is especially true considering that 86% of people
in the United States have a mobile phone48 and the mobile phone indus-
try is rapidly consolidating.49 When considering other industries, espe-
cially the technology industry, it is hard to believe that any of the four
large companies would not have a provision "obtaining" the consumer's
position regarding data collection or mobile tower location. Without a
true choice between companies, it is difficult for the consumer to "con-
sent." Essentially, one must conclude that mobile phone contracts are
contracts of adhesion: "form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis by
a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker power."50
In addition, a consumer may be forced to use a certain provider due to a
lack of phone coverage in his area.
The court also erred in claiming judicial deference while failing to fol-
low the canon of constitutional avoidance. Constitutional avoidance "is a
tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statu-
tory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not
intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts."51 Here,
the court held that the legislature, rather than the court, should decide
the policy in controversy. 52 This is an idealistic statement that is not
grounded in reality. It appears that the court implied some form of judi-
cial deference to the legislature when it could have avoided this constitu-
44. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. The argument is not about allowing people out of a contract they agreed to; rather,
it is about protecting a constitutional right that those people did not understand they were
giving away.
46. Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Application II, 724 F.3d at 613.
48. Social Networking Popular Across Globe: Arab Publics Most Likely to Express
Political Views Online, PEw RESEARCH (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/
12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/.
49. The "big four" mobile phone companies have an 86% market share in new
smartphone sales. T-Mobile Sees Growth in Sales on Strength of iOS in the US, KANTAR
WORLDPANEL (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/global/News/news-arti
cles/T-Mobile-sees-growth-in-sales-on-strength-of-iOS-UNcarrier-strategy; see also OS
(Operating System) and Network Shares-Smartphone Sales in the USA, KANTAR
WORLDPANEL, http://www.kantarworldpanel.com/dwl.php?sn=newsdownloads&id=299
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
50. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991).
51. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
52. Application II, 724 F.3d at 614.
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tional problem by exercising the ability of constitutional avoidance.53
Instead, the court cloaked its opinion in the language of judicial defer-
ence, which is at odds with the statutorily constructed opinion of the
Third Circuit.54 Courts have an obligation to protect against Fourth
Amendment encroachments; just because the legislature has the ability to
consider a matter does not mean the legislature's decision is correct or
constitutional.55 According to the Supreme Court, "the Constitution in-
vests the Judiciary, not the Legislature, with the final power to construe
the law." 56
This opinion is also flawed because the court was unclear in claiming to
have a "narrow" opinion.57 The court articulates no meaningful distinc-
tion between data from a phone call and other types of data routinely
communicated.58 Moreover, the court purports not to address orders re-
questing data when the phone is "idle," but does not clearly define this
word.59 Does "idle" mean that the phone is not being used as an actual
phone, or that no data is being transmitted? The first option is more
likely, as "[c]ell location information is quietly and automatically calcu-
lated by the network, without unusual or overt intervention that might be
detected by the target user. . . Some carriers also store frequently up-
dated, highly precise location. . . as the device moves around the net-
work."60 Additionally, the mobile phone user sends location data to cell
phone towers twenty-four hours a day, and there is no way to disable the
data.61 There must be some expectation of privacy when not using one's
phone. The court did not clearly define "idle"; it is difficult to tell when
data is actually taken.
The overriding problem with this opinion is that it attempts to take an
opinion from 197962 and apply it to today's technological world. The
ECPA's language is unsuited to a time in which mobile phones do much
more than originally contemplated. When the Act was passed in 1986,
there were only 340,213 mobile phone subscribers in the United States;63
there were approximately 315 million mobile phone subscribers in 2011.6
This dramatic change is also evident in cell towers, of which only 913
existed in 1985 and now number 251,000.65
The modern mobile phone is used in ways not remotely contemplated
by the 1986 ECPA. Originally, mobile phones could only make telephone
53. Id. at 616-17 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
54. See generally In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cit. 2010).
55. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
56. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992).
57. Application II, 724 F.3d at 615.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Application 1, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833-34 (S.D.T.X. 2010).
61. Id.
62. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
63. Wireless History Timeline, supra note 39.
64. Id.
65. Application I, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
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calls; today, they serve many functions. "Basic" phones feature text mes-
saging, Bluetooth, and the mobile web.6 6 "Smart" phones contain a host
of features including a camera, games, the internet, movies, a "mobile
wallet," music players, and email.67 In the United States, smart phones
began to outsell basic phones in 2011.68 Moreover, phones are not the
only devices that use cell towers-today, tablets such as the iPad and
notebook computers also access cellular networks.69 Should the authori-
ties have access to location data for all of the above activities? In theory,
tracking location by data may sound appropriate when one is only placing
a call. However, when the phone is used to access a bank account70 or
update a Facebook Status,71 these activities are more akin to those in a
private residence under protection of the Fourth Amendment. The ECPA
did not contemplate these mobile phone activities.
After examining the case, the court's opinion seems correct according
to precedent. However, the court makes several vital mistakes and fails to
fully consider the Fourth Amendment in the context of current-day tech-
nology. Instead of its stated rationale, the court should have applied the
Fourth Amendment more strictly. It should have been more aware of the
legal implications of current wireless technology. If the Fifth Circuit's
opinion is allowed to stand, government agencies will be further en-
couraged to violate privacy rights of Americans without any hesitation.
This opinion not only extends the holding in Smith,72 but opens a totally
new government system to spy on Americans using "articulable facts"
and "reasonable grounds," bypassing Fourth Amendment protections en-
tirely.73 Although the court held that its opinion does not apply when the
phone is "idle," this definition is not clear and will not prevent the expan-
sion of unauthorized monitoring of every aspect of daily life. This opinion
is a slippery slope that may be used to justify future erosions of the
Fourth Amendment.
66. See Basic Phones, VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/device/cell-phone
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
67. See Smartphones. Do More of the Things You Love., VERIZON, http://www.verizon
wireless.com/wcms/consumer/explore/smartphones.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
68. Peter Svensson, Smart Phones Now Outsell 'Dumb' Phones, 3 NEWS (Apr. 29,
2013, 12:01PM), http://www.3news.co.nz/Smartphones-now-outsell-dumb-phones/tabid/
412/articlelD/295878/Default.aspx.
69. See AT&T, http://www.att.com/shop/wireless/devices/ipad.html. (last visited Jan.
17, 2014).
70. BANK OF AM. MOBILE BANKING, https://www.bankofamerica.com/online-banking/
mobile.go (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
71. FACEBOOK MOBILE, https://www.facebook.com/mobile/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
72. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
73. Application II, 724 F.3d 600, 618 (5th Cir. 2013).
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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND
PRIVACY-THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FINDS
THAT STUDENTS HAVE NO
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT
TO CONFIDENTIALITY IN THEIR
SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Michael Sheetz*
IN May of 2013, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that a public high school student's privacy right
against unauthorized disclosure of her sexual orientation by a school
official was not sufficiently well-established to defeat the official's claim
of qualified immunity.' Noting that only one other circuit court had held
that the Fourteenth Amendment shields a person's homosexuality from
public disclosure by the state 2 and that no authority had ever considered
the issue in a school setting, the two-judge majority found that "there was
no violation of a clearly established federal right."3 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Fifth Circuit rightly emphasized that the disclosure in ques-
tion occurred in a public school, thereby giving due recognition to
Supreme Court precedent indicating that, while students do not "shed
their constitutional rights .. . at the schoolhouse gate,"4 they do not enjoy
the same level of privacy as adults in every situation.
In March of 2009, S.W., a sixteen-year-old public high school student
and softball player, attended a disciplinary meeting with her coaches.5
The coaches, Fletcher and Newell, confronted S.W. about a rumored sex-
ual relationship between S.W. and an eighteen-year-old girl who had a
reputation for drinking and drug use.6 Following this meeting, Fletcher
and Newell met with Wyatt, S.W.'s mother, to voice their concerns and to
alert Wyatt to her daughter's disruptive and potentially dangerous in-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2015; B.S. in Political Science,
summa cum laude, Southern Methodist University, 2011.
1. Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2013).
2. See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
3. Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 510.
4. Tinker v. Des.Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).




volvement with the older girl.7 Based on the coaches' statements, Wyatt
inferred her daughter's homosexuality.8 The coaches did not share any
information about S.W. with anyone besides her mother.9
Wyatt, as next friend of S.W.,10 filed suit in federal court against
Fletcher and Newell, alleging, inter alia, that the coaches had violated
S.W.'s constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." The defendants moved for summary judgment on Wyatt's Four-
teenth Amendment claims, relying on the defense of qualified
immunity.12 However, the trial court denied the motion, finding that
"S.W.'s right to privacy was clearly established at the time of the inci-
dent" and that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether
the coaches' actions were objectively reasonable.' 3 On interlocutory ap-
peal, a split Fifth Circuit panel reversed the denial and remanded the case
back to the trial court with orders to render judgment in favor of Fletcher
and Newell.14
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from
liability for unintentionally infringing on an individual's constitutional
rights in the performance of their discretionary duties.' 5 When correctly
applied, "[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal ques-
tions." 16 When a state official accused of violating a person's constitu-
tional rights raises the defense of qualified immunity at the summary
judgment stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove "that the of-
ficer's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law."' 7 To
find that a right is clearly established, courts "do not require a case di-
rectly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate"18 such that "every reasonable of-
ficial would understand that what he is doing violates [the law]." 19 At
minimum, a finding that a right is clearly established requires a "control-
ling authority-or a robust consensus of persuasive authority-that de-
fines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of
particularity." 2 0 While "officials can still be on notice that their conduct
7. Id. at 501.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1)(A). An adult parent may assert the legal rights of her
minor child as "next friend" to the minor. Id.
11. Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 501-02.
12. Wyatt v. Kilgore Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:10-cv-674, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137836,
10-11 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011).
13. Id. at 24-26.
14. Wyatt, 718 F.3d 496 at 510.
15. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).
16. Id. at 2085.
17. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005).
18. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
19. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations
omitted).
20. Id. at 371-72 (internal quotations omitted).
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violates established law even in novel factual circumstances," 21 a plaintiff
asserting the existence of such a law in the absence of a case directly on
point "must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that no reasonable of-
ficer could have believed his actions were proper." 22
The right that Wyatt sought to have the court recognize as clearly es-
tablished stems, if at all, from the Supreme Court's observation in Whalen
v. Roe that the Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine has developed
into two distinct branches: first, autonomy in personal decision making,
and second, "avoiding disclosure of personal matters."23 The latter
branch-the so-called right of confidentiality-protects citizens from hav-
ing their private information divulged to third parties by the state. How-
ever, the Court has provided virtually no guidance as to what types of
information trigger such protection. In fact, the Court noted in 2011 that,
ever since the right was first described in the late '70s, "no other decision
has squarely addressed a constitutional right to informational privacy." 24
Nonetheless, Wyatt and the dissenting judge pointed to a number of
cases, both inside and outside the Fifth Circuit, which they deemed suffi-
cient to define the contours of the right of confidentiality to include sex-
ual orientation. 25 The court ultimately regarded these cases as
unpersuasive for a number of reasons: only one case squarely recognizes
sexual orientation as protected information,26 decisions from other cir-
cuits held that sexual orientation is not protected, 27 and none of the deci-
sions cited by the dissent involves "the crucial question: whether a
student has a privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that forbids
school officials from discussing student sexual information during meet-
ings with parents." 28 The dearth of Supreme Court instruction on the is-
sue of informational privacy and the lack of any precedent applying that
privacy to high school students led the court to conclude that, even if
S.W. had a constitutional right to confidentiality in her sexual orientation,
that right was not sufficiently well-established to defeat the defendants'
qualified immunity.29
The dissenting judge took issue with the majority's narrowing of the
Plaintiff's asserted privacy right to the specific fact situation of the case,
pointing out that "the majority fail[ed] to provide any authority for its
finding that the right to privacy in personal sexual matters does not ex-
21. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002).
22. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
23. Whallen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
24. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2011).
25. See Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 513-14 (5th Cir. 2013) (Graves, J., dissenting).
26. See Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
27. See Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990). Note, however,
that the Walls opinion drew heavily from the logic of Bowers v. Hardwick and should thus
be critically reevaluated in light of Lawrence v. Texas and the subsequent development of
the right of sexual autonomy. See id. at 193.
28. See Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 509-10.
29. Id. at 510.
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tend to high school students."30 This assertion, however, mischaracterizes
the majority's opinion and misses the real issue in the case. The focus of
the analysis in a qualified immunity case is on the state of the law at the
time of the alleged violation and on whether the state official had fair
warning that his actions were infringing on a protected right. The issue in
Wyatt was not whether a privacy right of students in their sexual orienta-
tion exists, but whether such a right has been established clearly enough
by precedent to defeat the coaches' claim of qualified immunity. Like-
wise, the court did not hold that students have no privacy right in their
sexual orientation but, rather, that Wyatt failed to meet her burden of
showing that the existence of such a right was so plainly demonstrated by
existing case law that no reasonable official could have believed the
coaches' actions were permissible. The dissent's insistence that the major-
ity provide some affirmative proof that the right to confidentiality does
not extend to students implies that, once a right is demonstrated to exist
generally, no reasonable official could doubt that the right applies equally
in a school context. However, Supreme Court precedent in the area of
students' rights suggests just the opposite: that rights enjoyed by adults
are regularly curtailed or circumscribed when applied to students and
that, in the absence of a strong judicial consensus on the issue, a reasona-
ble school official could easily believe that her actions, though impermis-
sible if taken toward an adult, were permissible with respect to a student.
To be sure, the state's interests in maintaining a safe and productive
learning environment in schools and inculcating good behavior and
morals do not trump students' constitutional rights in every situation. As
the Supreme Court recognized in the context of a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a school's restriction on students' symbolic speech, "[i]t can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."3' The
same is true of students' freedom from unreasonable search and seizure,
as well as their procedural rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause.32 The rights of students in public schools are protected by
the Constitution, and actions by school officials that unreasonably in-
fringe upon those rights can give rise to civil liability. However, this does
not mean that a rule or restriction put in place by a school official is
automatically void, if it would not survive judicial scrutiny if applied to an
adult. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."33
A school official considering whether a generally recognized constitu-
tional right of adults applies equally to her students will find plenty of
examples in Supreme Court decisions suggesting a negative answer. For
30. Id. at 513 (Graves, J., dissenting).
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
32. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-48 (1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 584 (1975).
33. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
222 [Vol. 67
Qualified Immunity and Privacy
instance, the First Amendment freedom of expression recognized in
Tinker does not prohibit schools from placing politically neutral restric-
tions on student speech for legitimate educational reasons, even when
such restrictions would be unconstitutional if applied to an adult.34
Hence, a school may take disciplinary action against a student who gives
a vulgar speech to an audience of his classmates at a school function,
despite the fact that the same speech given by an adult to other adults
would be protected from state censorship.35 Likewise, a school may pro-
hibit student speech that encourages illegal drug use and may refuse to
publish student-written newspaper articles for any valid educational rea-
son.3 6 The Supreme Court has recognized that when school officials de-
termine that a given act of student expression threatens to "undermine
the school's basic educational mission," the Constitution does not bar the
school from restricting that expression.37 At very least, when precedent is
unclear on whether a restriction on a novel mode of student expression is
prohibited, qualified immunity should shield the erroneous-yet well-in-
tentioned-school official from liability in damages.38
Students' Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights may
also be reduced in relation to those of adults. Due process demands that
individuals facing a deprivation of liberty at the hands of the government
receive fair notice of the grounds for the deprivation, as well as an oppor-
tunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker.39 This is no less true
for students than for adults.40 However, due to the special characteristics
of the school environment, the form of the notice and hearing provided
may differ greatly between students and adults. For adults facing criminal
sanctions, notice and hearing usually take the form of a formal adver-
sarial proceeding with the aid of counsel and certain evidentiary safe-
guards. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that such extensive
procedural requirements would be impractical if applied to schools' rou-
tine disciplinary measures.41 Since "[s]ome modicum of discipline and or-
der is essential if the educational function is to be performed" and
"[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent occurrences [in schools] and
sometimes require immediate, effective action," the typical notice and
hearing guarantees are relaxed for students facing academic suspension. 42
Such students need only be afforded an informal discussion of their pun-
ishment, often only minutes after the student's objectionable act takes
place. 43 Although the privacy right Wyatt asserted is rooted in the sub-
34. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682-83.
35. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684-86.
36. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
37. Fraser 478 U.S. at 685-86.
38. Morse, 551 U.S. at 430-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79 (1975).
40. See id.
41. Id. at 579-80.
42. Id. at 580.
43. Id. at 582.
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stantive rather than the procedural side of due process, the Supreme
Court's approval of these reduced Fourteenth Amendment protections
for students does make Fletcher and Newell's belief in the permissibility
of their actions more reasonable.
In several cases, the Supreme Court has held that students enjoy less
constitutional protection compared with adults in a related area of pri-
vacy: privacy in one's person and effects. The Fourth Amendment's pro-
hibition on unreasonable searches and seizures typically requires the state
to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before searching an
adult's possessions." However, as with procedural due process protec-
tions, the Supreme Court has recognized that requiring strict adherence
to the warrant requirement in the context of school officials' searches of
students' possessions would inhibit "the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools." 45 As such,
schools are exempt from the warrant requirement, and the probable
cause standard for a search of a student's possessions is relaxed in favor
of a "reasonableness . .. under all the circumstances" standard.46 Further-
more, students like S.W. "who voluntarily participate in school athletics
have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, in-
cluding privacy," such that mandatory drug testing of student athletes
does not constitute an unreasonable search.47 Again, intrusions into stu-
dents' privacy that would violate the Constitution if done to an adult were
found permissible due to the unique needs of the school environment.
The fact that Fletcher and Newell disclosed S.W.'s homosexuality only
to her mother is of special importance, given parents' interest in receiving
information necessary to protect the safety and welfare of their children.
In other areas of privacy law, the Supreme Court has recognized that
parents' need to be informed of matters deeply impacting their minor
child's well-being may sometimes outweigh the minor's interest in keep-
ing those matters private. For instance, the Supreme Court upheld stat-
utes requiring parental notification or consent before a doctor may
perform an abortion on a minor, as long as the statutes provide a proce-
dure allowing the minor to judicially bypass the notice or consent
requirement.48
The numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld restric-
tions on students' and minors' constitutional rights in a school setting es-
tablish a general principle: because of the state's interest in maintaining
order, discipline, and administrative efficiency in schools, students often
enjoy decreased levels of constitutional protection in relation to adults in
44. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
45. Id. at 341.
46. Id.
47. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
48. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979); cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 897-98 (1992) (holding that a spousal notification requirement for a married
adult woman to have an abortion was an impermissible restriction on the woman's sexual
autonomy, though a comparable restriction would be valid for a minor).
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matters of privacy and self-expression. A school official reviewing these
cases could reasonably believe that a school policy necessary to preserve
the school's educational mission would not be struck down so long as it
served a valid educational purpose and reasonably accommodated stu-
dents' rights. With this principle in mind, the validity of Wyatt's assertion
of a right which no judicial authority has ever found to apply to students
in a school setting is in no way "beyond debate."49 The Fifth Circuit cor-
rectly found that, even if the general right of adults to confidentiality in
their personal information were clearly established (despite the circuit
split on the issue), Fletcher and Newell could reasonably have believed
that such right did not extend to the disclosure of a high school student's
sexuality to the student's mother as part of a disciplinary meeting.
Many of the arguments that led the Supreme Court, in the above-men-
tioned cases, to conclude that students do not enjoy the same protections
as adults apply with equal force in Wyatt. Teachers assume responsibility
for their students' well-being during school hours, and may be subject to
liability if their failure to address a student's behavioral problems causes
harm. Teachers concerned about their students' behavior must be able to
speak candidly with the students' parents and other school officials in
order to discover the root of problems and discuss possible solutions. The
student's sexuality may be an important factor in these discussions, espe-
cially for high school students who are approaching sexual maturity and
are more likely to make impulsive, self-destructive decisions without
proper guidance from the adults responsible for their care. Anti-gay bul-
lying is a major concern for teachers, with recent polls showing that more
than 80% of LGBT students had experienced harassment over their sex-
ual orientation.50 Teachers are also responsible for detecting and report-
ing signs of sexual abuse. In fact, many states, including Texas, have
mandatory sexual abuse reporting statutes for educators.51 Teachers who
suspect that a student is either the victim or perpetrator of sexual abuse
or anti-gay bullying will be unable to act on their concerns if they are
absolutely barred from revealing any information from which the listener
might infer the student's sexual orientation. Furthermore, as the facts in
Wyatt illustrate, a high school student's exposure to alcohol and illegal
drugs, which schools no doubt have a strong interest in regulating, is
often intertwined with the student's sexual activity. A myriad of concerns
for a student's physical, mental, and emotional health can arise from a
student's interactions with a boyfriend or girlfriend; these are concerns
that a teacher would rightfully feel obligated to communicate to the stu-
49. Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 2013).
50. See JOSEPH G. Kosciw ET AL., THE 2011 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY:
THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NA-
TION'S SCHOOLS, GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK (2012), available at
http://glsen.org/sites/default/files/2011%20National%2OSchool%20Climate%2OSurvey%20
Full%20Report.pdf.
51. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2013).
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dent's parents but which would be difficult, if not impossible, to express
without discussing any information related to the student's sexuality.
The Fifth Circuit in Wyatt correctly identified the school setting as a
key factor in deciding that the confidentiality right asserted by the plain-
tiff was not clearly established. Drawing from the Supreme Court's prece-
dent on students' rights, a school official who disclosed information about
a student's sexuality only to the student's parent and only to the extent
necessary to accomplish a legitimate disciplinary purpose could reasona-
bly believe that her actions were permitted. No petition for a writ of certi-
orari has been filed in the Wyatt case; however, should the case
eventually go before the Supreme Court, the Court should consider the
effect its ruling will have on the rights of both students and educators,
and the doctrine of qualified immunity as a whole. Although a holding
that the right asserted by Wyatt was clearly established might be a victory
for students' rights advocates, it would seriously undermine the protec-
tion that the qualified immunity defense is meant to afford public officials
by requiring them to predict courts' decisions in unsettled areas of the
law. When legal authorities are either silent or split on the existence of a
right in general, let alone in the unique context of a public school, a
school official should not be liable for honestly but erroneously deciding
that the right does not apply equally to students as to adults. On the other
hand, a holding affirming the Fifth Circuit's decision would not necessa-
rily decrease students' rights. It would not suggest the nonexistence of
students' right to confidentiality in their private sexual matters, but
merely that the contours of the confidentiality right need more particular
definition by the lower courts before qualified immunity can be defeated.
Such a holding would preserve the function of the qualified immunity
defense, while leaving open the possibility that the right asserted by Wy-
att could eventually be vindicated and encouraging the circuit courts to
further refine the scope of the right to confidentiality.
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